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Redeeming from tax sales: 
Bevan v Socal Communications Sites, 2003 
Roger Bernhardt 
 
When lienor foreclosed on debtor’s property, which was also subject to IRS lien, and 
eliminated IRS’s right of redemption in that property by paying to IRS amount owed by 
debtor to IRS, lienor did not become equitably subrogated to IRS claim. 
Bevan v Socal Communications Sites, LLC (In re Bevan) (9th Cir 2003) 327 F3d 994   
The Bevans owned property in Malibu subject to a loan secured by a deed of trust, of which 
Socal was the beneficiary. The IRS had a lien, junior to Socal’s, on the property for $60,000. 
After the Bevans filed a voluntary Chapter 13 petition, the IRS filed a proof of claim with the 
bankruptcy court for $60,000. After obtaining relief from the automatic stay, Socal foreclosed 
and obtained the property for $573,000 by bidding i the secured debt. Under 26 USC 
§7425(d)(1), the IRS could redeem the property if it paid Socal the full amount that Socal had 
bid at the foreclosure sale, plus interest and expenses that exceeded income Socal had received 
from the property. To avoid the IRS redemption, Socal paid the IRS the full amount owed and 
the IRS amended its bankruptcy claim to zero. Then, claiming it was equitably subrogated to the 
IRS’s right of redemption, Socal filed a proof of claim for the amount it paid to the IRS to obtain 
a release of the right of redemption. The bankruptcy court agreed with Socal and that decision 
was affirmed by the district court.  
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that this was not, “by any stretch of the imagination, a 
proper case for equitable subrogation.” Under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, a person 
who pays off a prior lien may be equitably subrogated to the position of the prior lienholder as 
against a later lienholder. However, Socal did not pay off a prior lien on the Malibu property and 
then seek to be subrogated to the position of the prior lienholder. Although Socal may have 
decided that the property was such a good buy that it could afford to pay the full amount of the 
Bevans’ taxes to the IRS to preclude redemption, if Socal were to succeed, it would entirely 
frustrate the purpose of the redemption statute, which is designed to prevent a windfall to a 
foreclosure purchaser. The IRS redemption right is intended to protect the taxpayer, who would 
otherwise be liable to the IRS for unpaid taxes but would have lost the excess profit from the sale 
of his or her real property. The court concluded (327 F3d at 998): 
We need not be hierophantic to divine the fact that Socal preferred keeping the Malibu 
property to receiving the full amount owed by the Bvans. So be it. But, considering Congress’s 
beneficent purpose in conferring a right of redemption upon the IRS, we also need not be 
rhadamanthine to decide that it would be inequitable to permit Socal to “get a windfall at the 
expense of” the Bevans.  
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: A junior creditor who learns that her security is about to be sold at 
a senior nonjudicial foreclosure sale can appear at the sale and bid up, if she believes that 
the property is worth more than the senior debt; or she can hope that, as a sold-out junior, 
she can sue her debtor and recover against some of his ther assets. And when the junior 
creditor is the IRS, it has the third choice of rede ming the property after the sale and 
getting title to the property by paying what the purchaser paid for it.  
As with post-sale redemption after judicial foreclosure sales, one result of this procedure 
is—or is supposed to be—to raise the bidding in order to deter the senior selling creditor 
from underbidding: The lower the senior bids, the more likely it is that a redemptioner will 
redeem and re-take the property. The selling senior can avoid redemption by bidding high 
enough to generate a surplus, which will pay the junior off and also raise the cost of 
redemption high enough to make it undesirable. 
Socal’s selling strategy in this case was not to bid enough to generate a surplus to cover 
the junior IRS lien, but instead to go to the IRS after the sale and pay off its junior lien—
another effective way of eliminating the risk of redemption. But just as Socal could not have 
asserted a claim against the debtor for any amount it overbid (had it followed that strategy), 
so also it could not make that same claim under the guise of equitable subrogation. Since 
the property was apparently worth enough to cover both liens (why else would Socal pay 
that much to deter redemption?), Socal did not suffer in having its claim rejected. What it 
got was worth all that it paid. Indeed, had Socal’s claim been allowed, it would have had a 
true “double recovery”—buying the property cheap and then recovering back what it paid 
for it.  
P.S. The court, in its somewhat lighthearted opinion, concludes by asserting that it sought 
to be neither “hierophantic” nor “rhadamanthine” in reaching its result. To spare you the 
effort, I looked these words up in the dictionary: A hierophant is an interpreter of sacred 
mysteries and a rhadamanth is a rigidly severe judge. (I hope you do not find me too 
temerarious or verbigerative in telling you all this.) —Roger Bernhardt 
 
